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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT ADOPTS A 
FOUR-PRONG TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER MIRANDA 
WARNINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO CURE A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
STATE V. GAY, 2008 ND 84, 748 N.W.2D 408 
I. FACTS 
On May 3, 2007, the Northwest Narcotics Task Force received infor-
mation indicating that probationer Ben Smith would be selling drugs in 
Williston, North Dakota.1  The tip claimed that Smith planned to meet a 
man driving a black car at Smith’s workplace and that the person meeting 
Smith intended to buy methamphetamine.2  The informant conveyed the in-
formation to probation officers Darin Cote and Lloyd Haagenson as well as 
other law enforcement officials.3 
After receiving the tip, several law enforcement officers watched 
Smith’s workplace and saw another male, later identified as David Gay, get 
into Smith’s vehicle with him.4  Deputy Verlan Kvande of the Williams 
County Sheriff’s Office knew that law enforcement had received informa-
tion and aided the Sheriff’s Office in the investigation.5  Deputy Kvande as-
sisted with the investigation after the other officers stopped Smith’s car.6  
 
1. State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d 408, 411.  Smith was a felon on probation for 
drug convictions in two separate counties.  Brief for Appellant at ¶ 4, State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, 
748 N.W.2d 408 (No. 20070348).  The identity of the informant was not disclosed in any of the 
police reports, testimony, or affidavits submitted during the pretrial suppression hearing.  Gay, ¶ 
2, 748 N.W.2d at 411. 
2. Gay, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  The unknown male arranged to buy a half-ounce of me-
thamphetamine from Smith.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
3. Gay, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  Probation Officer Cote and law enforcement set up surveil-
lance at Dakota Farms Restaurant, Smith’s place of employment.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 
1, ¶ 5. 
4. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  The officers noticed an adult male drive into the restau-
rant’s parking lot and park next to Smith’s vehicle.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 5.  Gay 
exited his vehicle and entered the passenger side of Smith’s vehicle. Id.  The police followed 
Smith and Gay to a gravel parking lot. Id.  Smith was spotted in the lot near a storage unit a short 
distance from his car. Id.  Smith was speaking to an individual named Bryce Raad, a known drug 
user. Id. 
5. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  Deputy Kvande did not know the source of the information 
or whether the source was reliable.  Brief for Appellee at ¶ 10, State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, 748 
N.W.2d 408 (No. 20070348).  Deputy Kvande did not participate in the surveillance of Smith’s 
place of employment.  Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411. 
6. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  The stop occurred several blocks from Smith’s place of em-
ployment. Id. 
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The officers were conducting a probation search of Smith and his vehicle 
when Deputy Kvande arrived on the scene.7  Officers also handcuffed the 
passenger, David Gay, before Deputy Kvande arrived.8  Prior to Deputy 
Kvande’s contact with Gay, officers read Gay his Miranda rights and hand-
cuffed him for officer safety.9  Deputy Kvande testified that he re-read the 
Miranda warnings to Gay, who was still handcuffed, and with Gay’s con-
sent conducted a pat-down search for weapons.10  No drugs, weapons, or 
other illegal materials were found on Gay’s person, but the officers discov-
ered a large sum of cash in Smith’s pocket and methamphetamine para-
phernalia in Smith’s car.11 
Deputy Kvande testified that he spoke with Gay after the pat-down 
search and Miranda recitation.12  Gay was still handcuffed at that time.13  
Deputy Kvande testified that Gay stated he was not involved in any drug 
deal, but that he smoked marijuana the previous day.14  Kvande then placed 
Gay under arrest.15  Officers detained Gay with handcuffs for about fifteen 
minutes prior to his formal arrest.16 
David Gay was arrested for ingestion of a controlled substance (mari-
juana), which is a class A misdemeanor in North Dakota.17  Gay brought a 
motion to suppress the statement he made to Deputy Kvande about smoking 
marijuana.18  The district court granted the motion on the ground that the 
basis for questioning Gay terminated after the initial search revealed that 
Gay was not a risk to officer safety.19  The district court then determined 




9. Id.  When Kvande arrived, Gay was standing by Smith’s vehicle with his hands hand-
cuffed behind his back.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 14. 
10. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411.  Kvande believed that officers also searched Gay for weap-
ons prior to Kvande’s arrival on the scene. Id. 
11. Id.  Deputy Kvande’s report and testimony did not indicate whether the cash and para-
phernalia were found before the first officers at the scene handcuffed Gay. Id.  Gay told Kvande 
that he came to Williston to buy a car from Smith.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
12. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 411-12.  Kvande left Gay for some time in order to assist offi-
cers with the third individual on the scene.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
13. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 412. 
14. Id.  Gay told Deputy Kvande that smoking marijuana was not illegal and that law en-
forcement could not do anything about it.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
15. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 412. 
16. Id. 
17. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, ¶ 5; N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.3 (Supp. 2007). 
18. Gay, ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412.  Deputy Kvande was the only witness called by the state at 
the suppression hearing to testify regarding the investigation, charge, and arrest of Gay. Id. ¶ 3, 
748 N.W.2d at 411. 
19. Id. ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412.  The district court explained the legal rationale underlying its 
decision on the record, but did not create written findings of fact. Id. ¶ 3, 748 N.W.2d at 411. 
       
2009] CASE COMMENT 217 
admitted to smoking marijuana.20  The district court further noted that being 
handcuffed was intimidating to the point that Miranda warnings did not 
cure the unlawful arrest.21  The State appealed the suppression order, argu-
ing the district court erred because the search and seizure of Gay was rea-
sonable under both the United States Constitution and the North Dakota 
Constitution.22  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s suppression order.23  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
administration of Miranda warnings to protect Gay’s right not to incrimi-
nate himself did not cure the ongoing Fourth Amendment violation.24 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule to 
prohibit evidence that is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment from 
being admitted against the victim of the unlawful search.25  To understand 
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence, an overview of the rule and 
discussion of the rule’s application to verbal statements is provided.26  Next, 
the reasonableness of pat-down searches is examined.27  Then, an explana-
tion of the application of North Dakota’s search and seizure law to vehicle 
passengers is considered.28  The next section examines the limitations im-
posed on a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights in North Dakota.29  Af-
ter the basic framework is established, the interaction between the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments is discussed.30  Finally, the prosecution’s statutory 
right to appeal in North Dakota is addressed.31 
 
20. Id. ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. ¶ 7. 
23. Id. ¶ 25, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
24. Id. ¶ 24. 
25. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398 (1914).  See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 28 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (“The nature of the exclusionary rule is such that 
it makes the cost of honoring the Fourth Amendment apparent.”). 
26. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing an overview of the exclusionary rule and dis-
cussing the rule’s application to verbal statements). 
27. See discussion infra Part II.B (examining the reasonableness of pat-down searches and 
stop and frisks). 
28. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing searches and seizures of vehicle passengers in 
North Dakota).  
29. See discussion infra Part II.D (examining a probationer’s limited Fourth Amendment 
rights in North Dakota). 
30. See discussion infra Part II.E (discussing the interaction between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments). 
31. See discussion infra Part II.F (addressing the statutory limitation upon a prosecutor’s 
right to appeal in a criminal case). 
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A. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO VERBAL 
EVIDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures; and it applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.32  The Fourth Amendment is a safeguard against 
government intrusion embedded in the United States Constitution.33  The 
North Dakota Constitution also protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.34  The Fourth Amendment does not, however, define the word 
“unreasonable.”35  The amendment also does not describe the relationship 
between the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and the conditions 
under which warrants may issue.36  Further, the Fourth Amendment is void 
of any language barring unlawfully seized items from evidence—now 
known as the exclusionary rule.37 
1. Overview of the Exclusionary Rule 
Courts initially formulated the exclusionary rule to serve two primary 
purposes: (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) to pro-
mote judicial integrity.38  Recognition of these rationales by the United 
States Supreme Court largely dictated the scope of the rule.39  Adherence to 
the rationales, however, prompted several exceptions to the rule.40 
 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV & XIV.  The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
33. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 5 (quoting JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966)). 
34. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:  
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” 
35. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 8 (discussing the origins of the Fourth Amendment). 
36. Id. 
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (noting the absence of any express remedy). See also 1 
LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 28-29 (stating that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment may not have 
contemplated the exclusionary sanction, but certainly envisioned compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment). 
38. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-23 (1960). 
39. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 23 (stating that the Supreme Court’s perception of the 
rule shaped its scope and could determine its fate). 
40. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 258-85 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (generally discussing the exceptions to the exclusion-
ary rule). 
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The “independent source” exception allows the admission of evidence 
gained independent of unlawful police activity.41  Specifically, the excep-
tion allows certain facts that are gained through an independent source to be 
used as evidence.42  The other relevant exception is the “attenuation doc-
trine” or the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” which allows the gov-
ernment to establish a causal connection between the unlawful activity of 
law enforcement and the evidence obtained.43  The causal connection must 
be “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the unlawful events.44  This 
doctrine applies not only to tangible evidence, but also to verbal state-
ments.45 
2. Exclusionary Rule Applied to Verbal Evidence 
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided Wong Sun v. United 
States,46 which declared that verbal evidence derived from an illegal arrest 
“is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible 
fruits” of an unwarranted arrest.47  In Wong Sun, federal agents arrested 
Hom Way for heroin possession.48  Hom Way, who was not a police infor-
mant, told agents that he bought an ounce of heroin from “Blackie Toy,” an 
owner of a laundromat.49  Several agents then went to a laundromat owned 
by James Wah Toy.50  Agents handcuffed and arrested Toy, but found no 
narcotics on the premises.51  Toy then told the agents that he did not sell 
narcotics, but knew someone named “Johnny” who did.52  Agents pro-
ceeded to Johnny Yee’s house, entered, and found Yee in the bedroom.53  
Yee took several tubes containing heroin from a drawer and surrendered the 
drugs to the agents.54 
 
41. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (allowing facts 
obtained through an independent source to be used as evidence). 
42. Id.  
43. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939). 
44. Id. at 341. 
45. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (applying the exclusionary rule 
to a verbal confession); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (excluding ver-
bal evidence obtained by law enforcement through illegal wire-tapping). 
46. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
47. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485. 
48. Id. at 473. 
49. Id.  Hom Way told the agents that the laundry was on Leavenworth Street. Id. 
50. Id.  Toy owned a laundry located on Leavenworth Street. Id. at 474. 
51. Id.  The Court’s record did not identify James Wah Toy as “Blackie Toy.” Id. 
52. Id.  Toy described the house where Johnny lived. Id.  He also described a bedroom in 
which Johnny kept approximately an ounce of heroin. Id. 
53. Id. at 475. 
54. Id.  Yee surrendered less than one ounce of heroin. Id. 
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Agents took Yee and Toy to the Office of the Bureau of Narcotics 
where Yee told officers that Toy and a man called “Sea Dog” brought the 
seized heroin to Yee four days earlier.55  Toy told the agents that “Sea Dog” 
was actually Wong Sun.56  James Wah Toy, Johnny Yee, and Wong Sun 
were arraigned and released on their own recognizance.57  A few days later, 
agents interrogated all three men at the Narcotics Bureau.58 
The Government’s evidence at trial consisted of four items: (1) the 
statements Toy made at the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin from Yee’s 
house; (3) Toy’s unsigned statement; and (4) Wong Sun’s unsigned state-
ment.59  The district court admitted all four items over objections that the 
evidence constituted inadmissible “fruits” of unlawful arrests or searches.60  
Wong Sun and James Wah Toy appealed after they were convicted of 
transportation and concealment of heroin.61  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the arrests of Toy and Wong Sun were unlawful because 
the arrests were not based on probable cause within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.62  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless 
held that the four items of evidence were not “fruits” of the unlawful arrests 
and thus were properly admitted at trial.63 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and de-
clared that verbal evidence derived from an unlawful entry or arrest may 
constitute a “fruit” in the same way as tangible items.64  The Court recog-
nized that the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule did not suggest a 
reason for distinguishing between physical and verbal evidence.65  Rather, 
the Court stated that a distinction between physical and verbal evidence 
might damage the underlying policies of the rule.66 
 
55. Id.  
56. Id.  Toy showed officers where Wong Sun lived.  Id.  Several officers entered the apart-
ment and brought Wong Sun out handcuffed. Id.  The officers searched the apartment but did not 
find narcotics. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 476.  An agent advised the men of their right to withhold information and their 
right to counsel. Id.  Toy’s statement was read to him, but he refused to sign it. Id.  Wong Sun also 
refused to sign his statement, but he admitted its accuracy to the officers. Id. at 477. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 473. 
62. Id. at 477. 
63. Id. at 478. 
64. Id. at 485. 
65. Id. at 486. 
66. Id.  See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-23 (1960) (proclaiming that judicial 
integrity is protected by the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (stating that excluding evidence is the foremost method of discouraging un-
lawful police conduct). 
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The Supreme Court assessed the evidence that prompted the officers to 
investigate Toy’s laundry and determined that the officers did not have 
probable cause to procure a warrant for Toy’s arrest.67  The lack of probable 
cause made Toy’s arrest unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.68  The un-
lawful activity prompted application of the exclusionary rule to Toy’s 
statements.69  The statements led law enforcement to Yee’s home, thus ena-
bling the officers to discover the drugs by utilizing the unlawfully obtained 
statements.70  The Court deemed the drugs “fruits” of the unlawful activity 
and consequently inadmissible against Toy.71 
The Court then applied the attenuation doctrine to Wong Sun’s un-
signed confession.72  The Court determined that the confession was not the 
fruit of an unlawful arrest, because the causal connection between the arrest 
and the confession attenuated the constitutional violation.73  The Court 
overturned Toy’s conviction, and held that Wong Sun was entitled to a new 
trial.74 
The Wong Sun Court did not explicitly declare that all unlawfully ob-
tained statements must be excluded from evidence.75  Exclusion of improp-
erly seized evidence is initially prompted by an unlawful or unreasonable 
search, but the attenuation question depends upon the specific facts of each 
case.76  Ordinarily, law enforcement must procure advance judicial authori-
zation through the use of warrants to conduct searches and seizures.77  The 
United States Supreme Court, however, formulated a limited exception to 
 
67. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. 
68. Id. 
69. Id.  After determining that the exclusionary rule applied to Toy’s statements, the Court 
analyzed the narcotics seized from Johnny Yee. Id. at 487. 
70. Id. at 488. 
71. Id.  As applied to Toy, the Court determined that neither the independent source excep-
tion nor the attenuation doctrine applied to the drugs found at Yee’s residence. Id. at 487 (citing 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) and Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
72. Id. at 491. 
73. Id. (citing Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).  Wong Sun was released after a lawful arraign-
ment, but voluntarily returned several days later to make the statement. Id. 
74. Id. at 491, 493. 
75. Id. at 491-92.  See also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 287 (recognizing that Wong Sun 
does not bar all statements made following an unlawful arrest). 
76. 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 259 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring)). 
77. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (reaffirming that law enforcement must utilize 
the warrant procedure whenever practicable); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) 
(holding that the admission of papers seized without a warrant was prejudicial error). 
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the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and the warrant requirement.78 
B. REASONABLENESS OF PAT-DOWN SEARCHES 
In Terry v. Ohio,79 the United States Supreme Court outlined both the 
prerequisites and underlying purposes of pat-down searches.80  This form of 
police contact is commonly called a “stop and frisk.”81  The Court pro-
claimed that police officers may conduct a brief search of a person’s outer 
clothing if the officer has reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, 
to believe that the person is armed and dangerous.82  Such a search is con-
sidered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized 
may be introduced as evidence against the person.83  These intrusive means 
are permitted to protect police officers and others in the area of the search.84  
The Court characterized the intrusions as “less than a ‘full’ search.”85  The 
next section will examine Terry and the reasonableness of stop and frisks.86  
The subsequent section will then provide an assessment of whether hand-
cuffs may be used during a frisk search and the duration of time reasonably 
allowed to conduct a frisk.87 
 
78. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (declaring that police officers are allowed to conduct frisks 
of a person’s outer clothing upon reasonable suspicion that the person is presently armed and dan-
gerous). 
79. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
81. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 636 (1991) (rejecting the suggestion that 
the use of such terms as “stop” and “frisk” place the police conduct outside the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court set forth the “stop and frisk” standard as: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to con-
clude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course 
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel 
his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of 
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer cloth-
ing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him. 
Id. 
83. Id. at 31. 
84. Id. at 26. 
85. Id. 
86. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (examining the United States Supreme Court’s validation 
of frisk searches). 
87. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing whether handcuffs may be used to effectuate 
a frisk and the duration of time which will be considered reasonable). 
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1. The United States Supreme Court Validates Stop and Frisk 
Searches 
In Terry, the defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon 
after Detective Martin McFadden grabbed John Terry, spun him around, 
and felt the outside of his clothing, which revealed a pistol.88  The ultimate 
issue was whether, under the totality of the circumstances approach, the of-
ficer’s actions violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.89  The 
Court first analyzed whether Terry was “seized” by Officer McFadden and 
whether, and at what point, McFadden conducted a “search.”90 
The State argued that a stop and frisk did not rise to the level of a 
“search” or a “seizure.”91  The Court rejected the notion that a stop and frisk 
conducted by police officers was outside the realm of the Fourth Amend-
ment.92  In defining a seizure, the Supreme Court stated that a person is 
seized whenever a police officer confronts the person and restrains the per-
son’s freedom to walk away.93  Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not ex-
clusively apply to circumstances when police make a “technical arrest” or 
conduct a “full-blown search.”94  The Court held that Officer McFadden 
seized Terry and subjected him to a search when the officer felt the outer 
surfaces of Terry’s clothing.95 
The Court, however, chose not to invalidate prior holdings that police 
must, whenever practicable, obtain warrants prior to conducting searches 
and seizures.96  Instead, the Court determined that the conduct in Terry did 
not necessitate an assessment of probable cause, but rather reasonable-
ness.97  The Court then examined the reasonableness of the search and sei-
 
88. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.  The officer observed two men, one later identified as John Terry, 
standing on a street corner. Id. at 5.  The officer noticed that one man would leave the other, pause 
and look in a store window, walk past the store, turn around, and walk back to the corner pausing 
to look in the store window again. Id. at 6.  The other man would then repeat these actions. Id.  
Each of the men did this about five or six times. Id.  A third man approached the men, spoke with 
them briefly, and all three men left the street corner. Id.  Officer McFadden believed that the men 
were “casing” a robbery. Id.  McFadden followed the men and approached them. Id.  He identified 
himself as a law enforcement officer then asked the men for their names. Id. at 6-7.  After the men 
“mumbled something” in response to McFadden, he conducted the pat-down search of Terry. Id. 
at 7.  The officer then patted down the other two men and discovered a gun on one man. Id. 
89. Id. at 8. 




94. Id. at 19. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 20. 
97. Id.  An assessment of probable cause was not required because the police conduct was 
not subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Id.  The Court stated that in deter-
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zure by analyzing whether the officer’s action was tenable from the begin-
ning, and whether the action was reasonably related to the events that gave 
rise to the intrusion.98  In order to meet the reasonableness threshold, the 
Court first required that the police intrusion be supported by specific facts, 
which reasonably warrant the interference.99  Next, the Court declared that 
the search must be limited to the discovery of weapons that might be used 
to harm the officer or others nearby.100  Ultimately, the Court declared a 
stop and frisk a “protective search,” calling it a brief intrusion upon the dig-
nity of the individual.101 
The Court applied this standard and held that Officer McFadden’s ac-
tions against Terry were reasonable under the circumstances.102  The fact 
that the officer limited his intrusion to what was necessary to learn whether 
the men were armed was crucial to the Court’s decision.103  Officer McFad-
den limited the scope of the intrusion; thus, the weapon seized from Terry 
was not subject to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.104  The Court, 
however, did not determine a reasonable duration for conducting the stop, 
or whether handcuffs could be used to effectuate the intrusion.105 
2. Use of Handcuffs and Prolonged Detentions to Promote 
Officer Safety 
Two significant concepts emerged from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Terry: (1) a seizure need not be deemed an “arrest” to be subject to 
Fourth Amendment requirements; and (2) a seizure that is limited in intru-
siveness may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the ab-
sence of probable cause, which is generally required.106  A Fourth Amend-
ment analysis essentially requires a determination of whether police have 
 
mining reasonableness, the test is the balance between the need to search and the intrusion that the 
search involves. Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). 
98. Id. at 19-20. 
99. Id. at 21.  The Court noted that the particular government interests involved were effec-
tive crime prevention, officer safety, and the safety of others. Id. at 22-24. 
100. Id. at 26. 
101. Id.  The intrusion is to be evaluated under a “reasonably prudent man” standard, but giv-
ing due weight to the reasonable inferences which a police officer is allowed to deduce from his 
experience in law enforcement. Id. at 27. 
102. Id. at 28. 
103. Id. at 30. 
104. Id. at 30-31. 
105. See id. at 30 (stating that each case must be decided on its own facts and limiting the 
holding to the facts presented). 
106. Id. at 26-30; see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 12 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (discussing whether a Fourth Amendment seizure 
constitutes an arrest). 
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made an arrest and, if so, when the arrest actually occurred.107  Physical re-
straint of an individual usually results in a conclusion that an arrest has been 
made, which in turn requires probable cause.108  Since Terry, however, sev-
eral courts and jurisdictions have held that the use of handcuffs in conduct-
ing a stop and frisk is reasonable.109 
In United States v. Miller,110 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the district court’s determination that a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration agent’s use of handcuffs on the defendant was the least intru-
sive means of conducting a Terry stop and was therefore reasonable under 
Fourth Amendment analysis.111  The agents involved in the investigation 
detained the defendants at an airport, searched their luggage, and found co-
caine.112  The Eighth Circuit declined to mistrust the agent’s decision to use 
handcuffs.113  The court stated that the nature of the crime of which the de-
fendants were suspected—drug trafficking—created a reasonable concern 
that the defendants carried weapons.114 
In Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5,115 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that an investigative stop lasting from thir-
ty-five to sixty minutes was reasonable and did not exceed the scope of a 
Terry stop.116  After an alleged shooting at a bar, and amid police confu-
sion, officers pulled over the two suspects as the suspects left the scene.117  
Police detained and questioned the men, and searched their vehicle.118  The 
officers did not find any evidence and released the men.119  The officer dis-
 
107. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 4 (examining the circumstances which may constitute 
an arrest). 
108. Id. at 9 (citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632 (2003)). 
109. See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s 
use of handcuffs was reasonable in conducting a Terry stop); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 
1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an officer’s use of handcuffs as a protective measure was 
not unreasonable or excessive); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999) (holding that 
briefly handcuffing vehicle occupants until officers determined that the occupants were not armed 
was reasonable). 
110. 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992). 
111. Miller, 974 F.2d at 957. 
112. Id. at 956-57.  A Los Angeles police officer alerted the agents of the defendants. Id. at 
955.  The police officer became suspicious of the defendants after questioning them in an airport. 
Id. at 956. 
113. Id. at 957.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the agent’s testimony, rec-
ognized that the suspects involved outnumbered law enforcement officials by six to three, and that 
the agent’s safety concerns were sincere. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. 174 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1999). 
116. Houston, 174 F.3d at 815. 
117. Id. at 811-12. 
118. Id. at 812.  Both men denied being involved in the shooting. Id. 
119. Id.  Police also suspected the men of an assault on a security guard. Id.  The officers did 
not find any evidence that implicated the men on the assault. Id. 
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patch logs showed that approximately thirty-three minutes elapsed between 
the shooting and the release of the two suspects, but the suspects claimed 
that the detention lasted about one hour.120  The suspects sued the officers, 
alleging that the stop and detention violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights.121  The men also argued that the use of weapons and handcuffs 
turned the investigative stop into an arrest unsupported by probable 
cause.122 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the investigative stop did 
not evolve into an arrest that would require probable cause.123  The court 
recognized that the length and method of an investigative stop must be ra-
tionally related to the reason for the primary intrusion.124  The court also 
noted that a Terry stop may turn into an arrest by the passage of time or use 
of force.125  However, the court determined that the officers did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.126  The court held that the use of handcuffs and the 
detention in a police vehicle did not exceed the scope of Terry because the 
precautions were rationally related to the investigation.127 
The Sixth Circuit stated that law enforcement officers can conduct a 
more exhaustive detention and questioning when their suspicions are not 
initially dispelled.128  The court also declared that meeting the Terry re-
quirements does not involve a precise time limit.129  Finally, the court de-
termined that the investigative stop, which included several steps and pro-
tective measures, was reasonably related to the original grounds for 
stopping the vehicle and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.130 
The use of handcuffs by police officers to effectuate a Terry stop may 
be reasonable in certain circumstances.131  Law enforcement officials are 
also allowed to continue the detention for as long as reasonably necessary 
to eliminate their initial suspicions.132  Whether these same procedures also 
 
120. Id. 
121. Id.  
122. Id. at 812-13. 
123. Id. at 814. 
124. Id. (citing United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 815. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (citing United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
130. Id. 
131. See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s 
use of handcuffs was reasonable in conducting a Terry stop). 
132. See Houston, 174 F.3d at 814-15 (stating that the duration of the stop must be reasona-
bly related to the grounds for the initial stop). 
       
2009] CASE COMMENT 227 
apply to vehicle passengers is important to understanding the Fourth 
Amendment framework.133 
C. SEIZURES AND PAT-DOWN SEARCHES AS APPLIED TO VEHICLE 
PASSENGERS IN NORTH DAKOTA 
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognizes three tiers of law en-
forcement-citizen encounters: (1) arrests, which require probable cause; (2) 
reasonable suspicion stops, which are seizures requiring a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) community caretaking en-
counters, which do not constitute Fourth Amendment seizures.134  In State 
v. Boline,135 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a seizure occurs 
when officers, by use of physical force or show of authority, have in some 
way restrained a person’s liberty.136  Later, the court decided that the same 
standard is appropriate in determining whether an officer seized a passenger 
of a vehicle.137 
1. Seizure of Vehicle Passenger Not Suspected of Wrongful or 
Criminal Conduct 
In State v. Heitzmann,138 police officers stopped a vehicle, in which 
Heitzmann was a passenger, because the driver operated the vehicle with a 
suspended driver’s license.139  An officer addressed Heitzmann, who ap-
peared nervous, and informed Heitzmann that the driver was under arrest.140  
The officer told Heitzmann that the vehicle would be searched, and asked 
 
133. See discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing whether seizures and pat-down searches of ve-
hicle passengers that are not suspected of any wrongdoing are also reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
134. State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 24, 575 N.W.2d 906, 909 (citing State v. Halfmann, 518 
N.W.2d 729, 730 (N.D. 1994)). 
135. 1998 ND 67, 575 N.W.2d 906. 
136. Boline, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d at 909 (quoting Halfmann, 518 N.W.2d at 731).  An officer 
seized the defendant when he asked the defendant to step outside a service station and into the of-
ficer’s patrol car. Id.  At the time of Boline’s seizure, the police were investigating an alleged do-
mestic violence crime. Id. ¶ 27, 575 N.W.2d at 909-10.  After an officer witnessed Boline driving, 
the officer approached Boline regarding the domestic violence allegations and the scent of alco-
hol. Id. ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d at 908.  The officer questioned Boline about the allegations, asked him 
if he had been drinking, administered field sobriety tests, and placed Boline under arrest for driv-
ing while impaired. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.  The court viewed the defendant’s presence in the patrol car as a 
momentary restraint of freedom indicative of a Terry stop. Id. ¶ 27, 575 N.W.2d at 910.  There-
fore, the defendant was initially seized, but not formally arrested. Id. ¶ 26, 575 N.W.2d at 909. 
137. State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶¶ 9-10, 632 N.W.2d 1, 6. 
138. 2001 ND 136, 632 N.W.2d 1. 
139. Heitzmann, ¶ 2, 632 N.W.2d at 4.  Police arrested the driver and informed him that the 
vehicle would be searched. Id.  A deputy told the officer that Heitzmann was on probation. Id.  
The deputy also told the officer that law enforcement had information that Heiztmann received a 
recent shipment of methamphetamine. Id. 
140. Id. ¶ 3, 632 N.W.2d at 5. 
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Heitzmann to exit the vehicle.141  The police officer then frisked Heitz-
mann.142  The officer felt a bag of “crushed substance” in Heitzmann’s 
pants pocket and asked Heitzmann to remove the contents, after which the 
defendant attempted to break free.143  The officer removed a sum of money 
from Heitzmann’s jacket.144  While the officer restrained Heitzmann by 
holding onto Heitzmann’s jacket, Heitzmann pulled his arm out of his jack-
et and ran.145  The officers took the defendant down to the ground and 
handcuffed him.146  Heitzmann then yelled that there was “crank” in his 
wallet.147  Officers found methamphetamine and a razor blade in Heitz-
mann’s wallet.148  He was charged with felony possession of a controlled 
substance.149  Heitzmann did not contest the investigative stop of the vehi-
cle, the driver’s arrest, or the officers’ right to search the passenger com-
partment of the vehicle.150  He did, however, argue that the pat-down search 
of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights.151 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a passenger’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated when police officers asked the passen-
ger to exit the vehicle so that the officers could search the vehicle incident 
to the driver’s arrest.152  The court cited State v. Gilberts153 in upholding the 
removal of Heitzmann from the vehicle.154  In Gilberts, the court acknowl-
edged two grounds that validate a passenger’s removal from a vehicle and 
make a brief search of the passenger both reasonable and permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment.155  The first basis was officer safety.156  The court 
stated that the interest in officer safety outweighed the minor intrusion on a 
passenger’s liberty.157  The second basis was that law enforcement officials 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  The officer told Heitzmann that the search was for “the safety of both Heitzmann 
and the officer.” Id. 
143. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
144. Id. ¶ 5. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.  Heitzmann’s arm was broken in the scuffle and the officers had to call for an ambu-
lance. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. ¶ 6. 
150. Id. ¶10, 632 N.W.2d at 6. 
151. Id. ¶ 7, 632 N.W.2d at 5. 
152. Id. ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 6. 
153. 497 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1993). 
154. Heitzmann, ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 6. 
155. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96.  The court stated that a reasonableness determination re-
quires balancing the public interest with the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary intrusion 
by law enforcement officers. Id. at 95. 
156. Id. (citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Minn. 1978)). 
157. Id. 
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are allowed to search the passenger compartment incident to a driver’s law-
ful arrest.158  Police officers are allowed to remove vehicle passengers in 
order to conduct a safe and thorough search of the vehicle.159  A seizure of a 
vehicle passenger does not, however, automatically justify a search of the 
passenger.160 
2. Search of Vehicle Passenger Not Suspected of Wrongful or 
Criminal Conduct 
The North Dakota Supreme Court then turned to Heitzmann’s search 
and stated that there is no automatic search rule for vehicle passengers.161  
A search occurs when the government interferes with a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.162  The Fourth Amendment allows police to require 
a passenger not suspected of committing a crime to exit a vehicle so that 
police can conduct a search of the vehicle.163  However, a frisk of the pas-
senger requires a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the passenger is 
armed and dangerous.164 
In Heitzmann, the court concluded that law enforcement had a reason-
able and articulable suspicion that the defendant could have been armed and 
dangerous; therefore, the frisk was warranted.165  The court analyzed the 
facts surrounding the frisk using the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach.166  The officers believed that the defendant had earlier received a 
shipment of methamphetamine.167  The defendant appeared nervous when 
approached by police.168  A deputy warned the officer conducting the 
search to be cautious of the defendant.169  Most importantly, the officer 
knew that an unloaded pistol was in the vehicle because the driver previ-
 
158. Id. 
159. Id. (citing United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
160. See State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7 (recognizing that there is 
no automatic search rule for vehicle passengers). 
161. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 92-96 (1979)). 
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Dunn, 
2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688, 690 (citing State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347, 351 (N.D. 
1996)). 
163. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96. 
164. Heitzmann, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, ¶ 22, 617 
N.W.2d 652, 657);  see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that limited frisk 
searches are permitted and defining the reasonable suspicion standard). 
165. Heitzmann, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d at 8. 
166. Id. at 7 n.1 (citing Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989)). 
167. Id. ¶ 12. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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ously told the officer.170  The court concluded that these facts amounted to 
reasonable suspicion and justified the officer’s frisk of Heitzmann.171 
The court also concluded that the officer acted reasonably in asking the 
defendant to remove the contents of his pockets because the officer rea-
sonably believed the protrusion might be a weapon.172  Thus, when a pat-
down search reveals an object that an officer reasonably believes might be a 
weapon, the officer may search the inner garments in order to determine 
whether the object is a weapon.173  In addition, Heitzmann’s evasion of the 
search triggered “extenuating circumstances” for a more intrusive search.174  
The court recognized that a more intrusive Terry search may be permitted 
under the Fourth Amendment if the detained person attempts to prevent an 
officer from performing a frisk.175  Threatening conduct by a detainee dur-
ing a frisk entitles law enforcement officials to act reasonably to protect 
themselves.176  Here, the defendant’s attempt to avoid the frisk, his resis-
tance during the search, and his nervousness led the court to conclude that 
the more intrusive search was reasonable.177 
Finally, the court examined whether the confrontation between the de-
fendant and police constituted an unlawful arrest not supported by probable 
cause.178  While there is no bright-line rule for when an investigative stop 
becomes a de facto arrest, the length of the interaction is an important factor 
in determining whether a seizure is justified on reasonable suspicion.179  
Other factors include the underlying purposes for the stop, the reasonable 
amount of time needed to effectuate those purposes, the severity of the 
crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to safety, and whether 
the suspect is resisting or evading the seizure.180  In Heitzmann, the deten-
tion was brief, the defendant was detained to effectuate a search upon a ve-
hicle incident to the driver’s arrest, and the defendant attempted to escape 
from police.181  Therefore, the detention amounted to a lawful arrest.182 
 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 8. 
172. Id. ¶ 14. 
173. Id. ¶ 13 (citing State v. Zearley, 468 N.W.2d 391, 392 (N.D. 1991)). 
174. Id. ¶ 17, 632 N.W.2d at 10. 
175. Id. ¶ 16, 632 N.W.2d at 9. 
176. Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 498 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)). 
177. Id. ¶ 17, 632 N.W.2d at 10. 
178. Id. ¶ 18.  Law enforcement is allowed to use some degree of force to achieve the inves-
tigation’s purpose, maintain the status quo, and promote officer safety. Id. (citing Rhodes v. State, 
945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). 
179. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. ¶ 19, 632 N.W.2d at 10-11. 
182. Id. at 11. 
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In North Dakota, passengers can be removed from a vehicle so that of-
ficers can conduct a lawful search of the vehicle.183  To search the passen-
ger, officers must have reasonable suspicion the passenger is armed and 
dangerous.184  In addition to analyzing the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
vehicle passenger, the North Dakota Supreme Court has examined whether 
probationers enjoy these same protections.185 
D. LIMITATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UPON 
PROBATIONERS 
In 1972, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a proba-
tioner’s Fourth Amendment rights are limited because of their status as a 
probationer.186  Thirty-two years later, the court decided State v. Krous187 
and held that certain probationary conditions, if accepted by the proba-
tioner, constitute consent to reasonable warrantless searches.188  In Krous, 
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment, followed by probation, for 
controlled substance violations.189  Police officers went to the defendant’s 
home and conducted a probation search after the defendant neither reported 
nor responded to her probation officer.190  The State moved to revoke the 
defendant’s probation based on drugs and drug paraphernalia discovered 
during the search.191  The defendant moved to suppress the drugs and para-
phernalia.192  Krous argued that the word “submit” in her conditions of pro-
bation required officers to ask permission prior to conducting a search.193  
Krous contended that if she then opposed the search, her probation could be 
revoked.194 
The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the district court’s denial of 
the suppression motion.195  The North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted 
 
183. Id. ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 7. 
184. Id. ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d at 8. 
185. See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing the limitations that may be placed on a proba-
tioner’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
186. State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972). 
187. 2004 ND 136, 681 N.W.2d 822. 
188. Krous, ¶ 19, 681 N.W.2d at 827.  The probation condition at issue was as follows: 
“Condition (2)(h) Defendant shall submit to search of her person, vehicle, or place of residence by 
any probation officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant.” Id. ¶ 2, 
681 N.W.2d at 824. 
189. Id. ¶ 2. The probation conditions subjected Krous to warrantless searches. Id. 
190. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.  Krous was also seen associating with a known drug user. Id. ¶ 3.  Officers 
did not seek permission to search the defendant’s residence. Id. ¶ 4. 




195. Id. ¶ 23, 681 N.W.2d at 827. 
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the terms of the defendant’s probation and determined that the word “sub-
mit” included future consent to reasonable searches, which do not require 
officers to seek consent at the time of the search.196  The court rejected the 
defendant’s request to interpret the word “submit” to allow the probationer 
to resist a search.197  The court also declared that probationers enjoy limited 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.198  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
concluded that the judiciary has a duty to monitor a probationer’s activities 
to aid in the rehabilitation process.199  Allowing a probationer to oppose a 
search defeats the purposes of probation conditions employed to prevent 
further wrongdoing by the probationer.200 
While probation searches may be considered reasonable under certain 
probation conditions, the searches must not be conducted in an unreason-
able manner.201  Probation conditions do not justify infringement upon the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.202  The United States Su-
preme Court has also examined whether affording an unlawfully seized in-
dividual with the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda protections justifies in-
fringement upon the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.203 
E. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH 
AMENDMENTS 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “No 
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”204  The Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards that protect 
 
196. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 681 N.W.2d at 826, 827.  Probation searches are derived from North Da-
kota Century Code section 12.1-32-07, which provides: 
When imposing a sentence to probation, probation in conjunction with imprisonment, 
or probation in conjunction with suspended execution or deferred imposition of sen-
tence, the court may impose such conditions as it deems appropriate, and may include 
any one or more of the following: . . . (n) Submit the defendant’s person, place of resi-
dence, or vehicle to search and seizure by a probation officer at any time of the day or 
night, with or without a search warrant. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(4) (Supp. 2007). 
197. Krous, ¶ 15, 681 N.W.2d at 826.  Krous argued that the court should adopt Oregon au-
thority which states that a probationer may resist a search, but then the probationer risks having 
his or her probationary status revoked. Id. (citing State v. Gulley, 921 P.2d 396, 398 (Or. 1996)).  
Oregon courts also hold that a probationer’s consent to reasonable searches is not prospective and 
must be given before a search is conducted. Id. (citing Gulley, 921 P.2d at 398). 
198. Id. ¶ 16 (citing State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972)). 
199. Id. (citing Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d at 139). 
200. Id. ¶ 18, 681 N.W.2d at 827. 
201. Id. ¶ 21. 
202. Id.  
203. See discussion infra Part II.E (examining whether the Miranda warnings are sufficient 
to dissipate the taint of an unlawful arrest). 
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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an individual’s right to be free from coercive self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment.205  Under certain conditions, Miranda allows exclusion 
of incriminating statements made in the absence of warnings.206  The warn-
ings are meant to deter law enforcement officials from obtaining incriminat-
ing statements without first informing the declarant of his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights.207 
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the ef-
fect of administering Miranda warnings to an individual following a Fourth 
Amendment violation.208  In Brown v. Illinois,209 the Court declared that 
Miranda warnings are not a means of remedying or deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations even though, ninety years prior, the Court recog-
nized the “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.210  
While the Amendments are interrelated, application of the exclusionary rule 
under the Fourth Amendment protects different interests than those pro-
tected under the Fifth Amendment.211  The Fourth Amendment applies to 
all unlawful searches and seizures, regardless of whether any incriminating 
evidence is discovered.212  The Fifth Amendment, however, may only re-
quire exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings.213  The 
exclusion of an unwarned confession under the Fifth Amendment does not 
fully protect Fourth Amendment rights.214  According to the Court, Miran-
da warnings alone do not sufficiently deter Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.215 
In Brown, officers investigating a murder received information that 
Brown was an acquaintance of the victim.216  Two officers entered Brown’s 
apartment, searched the residence, and arrested Brown when he returned 
home.217  The officers acted without probable cause or an arrest warrant.218  
 
205. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966). 
206. Id. at 458. 
207. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-01 (1975) (stating that the Miranda warnings 
deter the taking of incriminating statements without first advising an individual of his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights). 
208. See id. at 603 (holding that Miranda warnings do not per se attenuate the taint of an un-
constitutional arrest). 
209. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
210. Brown, 422 U.S. at 601 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)) (ob-






216. Id. at 592. 
217. Id.  The officers held Brown at gunpoint, ordered him to stand against the wall, 
searched him, and arrested him for murder. Id. at 593.  On the way to the police station, Brown 
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The two officers informed Brown of his Miranda rights, and questioned 
Brown for about twenty-five minutes.219  Brown’s signed statement pro-
vided that on the evening prior to the murder, he and another man, Jimmy 
Claggett, visited the victim.220  Brown admitted that the men drank alcohol 
and smoked marijuana.221  Brown stated that Claggett ordered Brown to 
bind the victim with a cord.222  According to Brown, Claggett then shot the 
victim three times.223 
Several hours later, an Assistant State’s Attorney informed Brown of 
his Miranda rights.224  The Assistant State’s Attorney told Brown that he 
would be charged with murder and Brown gave a second statement with a 
factual account of the murder.225  Brown subsequently refused to sign this 
statement.226  Both Brown and Claggett were indicted for the murder.227  
Brown moved to suppress his two statements, alleging that his arrest and 
detention were unconstitutional.228  The motion was denied, and Brown was 
found guilty.229  On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions.230  The Court concluded that Brown’s arrest was unlawful, but held 
that the administration of Miranda warnings broke the causal chain between 
the unlawful arrest and the statements.231  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and rejected the Illinois Supreme Court’s per se rule.232 
The Court first declared that even if the defendant’s statements were 
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue re-
mained.233  The Court cited to Wong Sun and stated that the admissibility of 
the statements must also be analyzed under Fourth Amendment policies and 
interests.234  To declare Miranda warnings sufficient to rectify an unconsti-
 
evaded police questioning. Id. at 593-94.  Police placed Brown in an interrogation room upon ar-
rival at the station. Id. at 594. 
218. Id. at 592. 
219. Id. at 594. 
220. Id. at 594-95. 





226. Id. at 596. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id.  At trial the State elicited testimony regarding Brown’s two statements, but the first 
statement was not placed into evidence. Id.  The second statement was read to the jury in full. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 596-97. 
232. Id. at 597, 603. 
233. Id. at 601-02. 
234. Id. at 602. 
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tutional arrest would curtail the exclusionary rule and remove the incentive 
to avoid constitutional violations.235  The Miranda warnings would essen-
tially become a “cure-all,” reducing the Fourth Amendment protections to a 
form of words.236  Instead, the Court devised four factors to determine 
whether Miranda warnings break the causal connection between unconsti-
tutional arrests and confessions.237  The four attenuation factors included: 
(1) whether Miranda warnings were administered; (2) the temporal prox-
imity between the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening 
circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy behind the unlawful arrest 
or misconduct.238 
The Court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of showing 
Brown’s statements were admissible under Wong Sun.239  The Court also 
declined to overrule Wong Sun, which the Court stated must be done for the 
first statement to be admissible.240  Thus, Brown’s second statement was a 
“fruit” of the first statement and was inadmissible.241  The Court acknowl-
edged that the officers’ unlawful search for evidence was intentional, but 
the Court limited its holding to the error made by the Illinois courts in de-
termining that Miranda warnings remedy an unlawful arrest.242 
Twenty-six years after Brown, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied the four-prong Brown test to determine whether Miranda warnings 
were sufficient to rectify Fourth Amendment violations.243  In United States 
v. Reinholz,244 police officers investigated the defendant for purchasing thir-
ty grams of iodine crystals, which are used in the manufacturing of me-
thamphetamine, from pharmaceutical stores.245  Officers obtained and exe-
cuted a search warrant on Reinholz and his residence.246  Prior to the police 
search of his residence, and without Miranda warnings, Reinholz told an 
officer that drug paraphernalia would be found and that the paraphernalia 
belonged to Reinholz.247  Officers then informed Reinholz of his Miranda 
 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 602-03 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)). 
237. Id. at 603-04. 
238. Id.  The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold determination. Id. at 604. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 604-05. 
241. Id. at 605. 
242. Id. 
243. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001). 
244. 245 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2001). 
245. Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 770. 
246. Id. at 771.  Police officers apprehended Reinholz, searched him, handcuffed him, and 
drove to his residence. Id.  The officers informed Reinholz that his residence would be searched, 
and then Reinholz made the admission. Id. 
247. Id. 
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rights.248  Reinholz waived his rights, and repeated his admission.249  Law 
enforcement officers found drugs in the garage, and Reinholz admitted to 
manufacturing methamphetamine.250  He was thereafter indicted on several 
drug charges and filed a motion to suppress the evidence on several 
grounds, including unlawful arrest.251  The district court granted the motion, 
holding that Reinholz was unlawfully arrested and that no causal break ex-
isted between the arrest and the statements Reinholz made to police.252 
The Eighth Circuit cited Brown and recognized that unlawfully ob-
tained statements must be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and must 
not be the result of an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to be 
admissible.253  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals listed four attenuation 
factors for determination: (1) whether Miranda warnings were administered 
to the suspect prior to the statement; (2) the temporal proximity of the 
statements to the unlawful seizure; (3) the existence of intervening causes 
between the unlawful arrest and the statements; and (4) the purpose or fla-
grancy of the police misconduct.254  The court held that the defendant’s 
statements were all inadmissible due to his unconstitutional arrest.255 
Recitation of the Miranda warnings does not serve as a “cure-all” to 
Fourth Amendment violations.256  Rather, the attenuation determination is a 
matter of degree, which depends upon the facts of each case.257  The factors 
derived from Brown offer guidance in determining whether statements ob-
tained following an unlawful detention are attenuated enough to cure the 
unlawful police activity.258  In North Dakota, if a district court orders the 
unlawfully obtained statements suppressed, and the prosecutor appeals, the 




250. Id. at 772. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 779. 
253. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)). 
254. Id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04). 
255. Id. at 780. 
256. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)). 
257. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring); see also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 259 (recogniz-
ing that the test of attenuation depends on the particular facts of each case). 
258. See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 260 (stating that there is no bright-line test for deter-
mining whether there is an attenuation between a Fourth Amendment violation and evidence de-
rived therefrom). 
259. See City of Harvey v. Fettig, 2001 ND 12, ¶ 5, 621 N.W.2d 324, 325 (stating that the 
prosecution’s right to appeal is limited by statute). 
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F. PROSECUTION’S STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL IN NORTH 
DAKOTA 
In North Dakota, a prosecutor’s right to appeal in a criminal case is li-
mited by statute.260  In City of Harvey v. Fettig,261 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court dismissed an appeal from an order granting the defendant’s 
motion to suppress, because a statement by the prosecutor, as required by 
North Dakota Century Code section 29-28-07(5), did not accompany the 
appeal.262  The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the prosecutor dili-
gently evaluates the case and the effect of the suppression order, prior to fil-
ing the notice of appeal.263 
In Fettig, a police officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a head-
light violation.264  The driver fled the scene, and law enforcement towed the 
vehicle to Harvey City Hall.265  Law enforcement officers then conducted a 
warrantless search of the vehicle.266  The officers found alcoholic bever-
ages, the defendant’s wallet, and the defendant’s driver’s license in the ve-
hicle.267  An officer visited Fettig’s home and questioned him regarding the 
incident.268  Fettig admitted to being the driver and having beer in the vehi-
cle.269  The trial court held that the warrantless search of the vehicle was a 
violation of Fettig’s right to be free from unreasonable searches under the 
Fourth Amendment.270  The City of Harvey filed an interlocutory appeal af-
ter the trial court suppressed statements made by Fettig and the evidence 
that alcohol was found in his vehicle.271 
 
260. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (2006).  The section provides: 
An appeal may be taken by the state from: . . . (5) An order granting the return of 
property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, when ac-
companied by a statement of the prosecuting attorney asserting that the appeal is not 
taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact mate-
rial in the proceeding.  The statement must be filed with the clerk of district court and 
a copy must accompany the notice of appeal. 
Id.  An argument premised on the prosecution’s failure to properly appeal will not always arise, 
but in Gay the defendant argued and the court addressed the issue.  Brief for Appellee, supra note 
5, ¶ 14; State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 408, 412. 
261. 2001 ND 12, 621 N.W.2d 324. 
262. Fettig, ¶ 1, 621 N.W.2d at 325. 
263. Id. ¶ 6 (citing State v. Norton, 2000 ND 153, ¶ 5, 615 N.W.2d 531, 533). 
264. Id. ¶ 2. 
265. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
266. Id. ¶ 3. 
267. Id.  Fettig was also the registered owner of the vehicle. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id.  Fettig was charged with minor in possession, open container, fleeing an officer, care 
required, and a parking violation. Id. ¶ 4. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
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The prosecuting attorney filed an affidavit with the notice of appeal 
and other documents, but the documents did not mention the statute or the 
statutorily required statement.272  The affidavit was void of any language 
that indicated the appeal was not taken for purposes of delay.273  The docu-
ment also failed to explain the relevance and importance of the suppressed 
evidence.274  Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal proclaiming that the 
statement “must have substance” and cannot merely paraphrase the statu-
tory language.275  The court emphasized that prosecutors must supplement 
their appeals with a description of the relevance of the suppressed evi-
dence.276  The appeal will not proceed unless the court is satisfied with the 
prosecutor’s statement.277  The North Dakota Supreme Court applied this 
analysis to State v. Gay278 in 2008.279 
III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Kapsner wrote for the majority in Gay, joined by Chief Justice 
VandeWalle and Justice Crothers.280  The majority allowed the State’s ap-
peal to proceed and ultimately adopted the four-prong test derived from 
Brown to determine whether Miranda warnings are sufficient to dissipate 
the taint of an unreasonable seizure.281  Justice Sandstrom dissented and 
was joined by Justice Maring.282 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The first issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether 
the State’s appeal was properly taken in the case.283  The court allowed the 
appeal to proceed, because the State referenced the relevant statute, ad-
dressed both prongs of the statute, and the suppressed evidence was clearly 
pertinent to the prosecution.284  The second issue was whether the trial court 
erred in suppressing the defendant’s statements.285  The court held that the 
 
272. Id. ¶ 7, 621 N.W.2d at 326. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 621 N.W.2d at 325. 
276. Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 325. 
277. Id. 
278. 2008 ND 84, 748 N.W.2d 408. 
279. See discussion infra Part III (providing analysis of the opinion in State v. Gay). 
280. Gay, ¶¶ 1, 26, 748 N.W.2d at 411, 417. 
281. Id. ¶¶ 10, 23-24, 748 N.W.2d at 413, 417. 
282. Id. ¶ 34, 748 N.W.2d at 420 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
283. Id. ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d at 412. 
284. Id. ¶ 10, 748 N.W.2d at 413. 
285. Id. ¶ 11. 
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stop and search of the vehicle in which Gay rode as a passenger was consti-
tutional.286  The court, however, upheld the suppression of Gay’s state-
ments, because his continued seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.287  
Finally, the court addressed whether Miranda warnings cure a Fourth 
Amendment violation.288  The court applied the factors from Brown to 
Gay’s case and concluded that the suppression order was proper.289 
1. Proper Appeal by the State 
Gay argued that the prosecution did not properly appeal from the sup-
pression order.290  The court permitted the prosecution’s appeal pursuant to 
North Dakota Century Code section 29-28-07(5).291  The court distin-
guished Gay from Fettig and determined that the prosecution adequately re-
ferenced both prongs of the statute.292  The court found that although the 
State failed to describe the relevance and necessity of the suppressed evi-
dence, the facts alone demonstrated the importance of the statements.293  
The statements were the only evidence indicating that Gay ingested a con-
trolled substance.294  The relevance of this evidence was apparent, so the 
court did not require an explanation.295  The appeal proceeded and the court 
next examined the suppression of Gay’s statements regarding the use of ma-
rijuana.296 
2. Suppression of the Statements 
The court reviewed the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress 
evidence.297  The North Dakota Supreme Court, when reviewing a suppres-
sion order, defers to the trial court’s findings of fact and resolves eviden-
tiary conflicts in favor of affirmance.298  The court addressed:  (1) the stop 
and search of the vehicle in which Gay rode; (2) the pat-down search con-
ducted upon Gay; and (3) whether the police conduct following the pat-
 
286. Id. ¶ 12. 
287. Id. ¶ 18, 748 N.W.2d at 415. 
288. Id. ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416. 
289. Id. ¶ 24, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
290. Id. ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d at 412. 
291. Id. ¶ 10, 748 N.W.2d at 413 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (2006)). 
292. Id. ¶¶ 9-10 (citing City of Harvey v. Fettig, 2001 ND 12, ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d 324, 326). 
293. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Fettig, ¶ 8, 621 N.W.2d at 326). 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. ¶ 11. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. (citing State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, ¶ 5, 678 N.W.2d 126, 128). 
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down search was constitutional.299  The North Dakota Supreme Court af-
firmed the suppression order because Deputy Kvande’s testimony and po-
lice reports supported the trial court’s factual conclusions.300 
a. Stop and search of the vehicle 
The court held that the stop and search of the vehicle in which Gay was 
a passenger posed no constitutional problem.301  Gay rode with Smith, a 
probationer with limited Fourth Amendment rights.302  The officers stopped 
Smith’s vehicle to conduct a probation search.303  The court relied on Krous 
to state that officers did not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to render the stop and search of the vehicle constitutional 
since the premise of the stop was a probation search of Smith’s vehicle.304  
The search of the vehicle alone, however, did not justify a search of the pas-
senger.305 
b. The pat-down search of Gay 
The State argued that the initial pat-down search of the defendant was 
constitutional because law enforcement based the search on officer safe-
ty.306  First, the court provided the applicable North Dakota and federal 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.307  The court derived the definition of a 
“seizure” from both Heitzmann and Boline.308  The court then acknowl-
edged the proper standard for determining the reasonableness of a seizure 
under North Dakota law.309  The public interest in safety must be balanced 
with the person’s right to be free from arbitrary interference by law en-
forcement.310  Lastly, the court defined a “search.”311  A search occurs 
when law enforcement intrudes upon a person’s “reasonable expectation of 
 
299. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 17, 748 N.W.2d at 413-15. 
300. Id. ¶ 20, 748 N.W.2d at 416. 
301. Id. ¶ 12, 748 N.W.2d at 413. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. (citing State v. Krous, 2004 ND 136, ¶ 19, 681 N.W.2d 822, 827). 
305. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414 (citing State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶¶ 10-11, 632 
N.W.2d 1, 6-7).  
306. Id. ¶ 13, 748 N.W.2d at 413. 
307. Id. ¶ 14, 748 N.W.2d at 414. 
308. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6; State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 26, 575 
N.W.2d 906, 909).  A seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer stops an individual and re-
strains the individual’s freedom. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6).  The officer must 
restrain a person’s liberty in order for a seizure to occur. Id. (citing Boline, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d at 
909). 
309. Id. 
310. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6). 
311. Id. 
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privacy.”312  Relying upon the United States and North Dakota Constitu-
tions, the court emphasized that searches, like seizures, must be reason-
able.313 
The court then examined the removal of Gay from the vehicle.314  The 
court analyzed Heitzmann to determine whether Gay’s removal from the 
vehicle was constitutionally permissible.315  The court determined that re-
moving a passenger for officers to conduct a search of the vehicle was rea-
sonable.316  The same is true even if the passenger did not commit a traffic 
violation and is not suspected of criminal activity.317  The court recognized, 
however, that there is no “automatic search rule” that allows law enforce-
ment to search persons associated with an arrested individual.318  Instead, 
the court proclaimed that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a 
person, including a passenger, is armed and dangerous to conduct a pat-
down search.319 
Finally, the court quoted Terry in recognizing the prerequisites and the 
limited purposes underlying a pat-down search.320  The North Dakota Su-
preme Court deferred to the district court’s factual findings on the initial 
pat-down search and handcuffing of Gay.321  The court upheld the district 
court’s conclusion, based on Deputy Kvande’s testimony, that these actions 
were constitutional because of the officers’ safety concerns.322  The court 
then examined the police conduct following the initial pat-down search to 
determine whether it was constitutionally permissible.323 
c. The prolonged detention 
The district court concluded that the police conduct following the ini-
tial search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.324  Relying on 
 
312. Id. (citing State v. Dunn, 2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688, 690). 
313. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV and N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
314. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414-15. 
315. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶¶ 10-11, 632 N.W.2d at 6-7). 
316. Id. at 414. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).  Law enforcement must be allowed to 
conduct a search for weapons in order to protect officer safety. Id.  The standard is “whether a rea-
sonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that 
of others was in danger.” Id. 
321. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20, 748 N.W.2d at 415, 416. 
322. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 415. 
323. Id. ¶ 17. 
324. Id.  The State argued that the detention of Gay “lasted no longer than reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and that the officers used the least intrusive means avail-
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Heitzmann, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a frisk is not a pre-
cursor to conducting a more exhaustive search.325  Here, the court recog-
nized that law enforcements’ use of handcuffs restrained Gay’s liberty.326  
The officers’ use of handcuffs on the defendant consequently amounted to a 
seizure under Boline.327  The seizure, however, continued after police de-
termined Gay was not a threat to officer safety.328 
The court noted that officers may use forcible means to effectuate the 
investigation, maintain the status quo, or promote officer safety, as long as 
the means are reasonable.329  Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
agreed with the district court’s finding that after law enforcement frisked 
Gay, searched Smith, and searched Smith’s car, Gay’s continued seizure vi-
olated his Fourth Amendment rights.330  The court held that the Fourth 
Amendment violation warranted application of the exclusionary rule.331 
The court concluded by reviewing the facts of the case.332  Deputy 
Kvande arrived at the scene after officers handcuffed, frisked, and informed 
Gay of his Miranda rights.333  Kvande then searched Gay a second time, left 
him handcuffed, re-read Gay his Miranda rights, and questioned Gay about 
his involvement with Smith.334  The questioning led to Gay’s admission to 
smoking marijuana the previous day.335  The court deferred to the factual 
findings of the district court and held that Gay’s statements were made dur-
ing an unlawful seizure, which warranted application of the exclusionary 
rule under Wong Sun.336 
3. Adoption of the Four-Prong Attenuation Test 
Finally, the court examined whether Miranda warnings, which guard 
against Fifth Amendment violations, are adequate to attenuate the taint of 
 
able to dispel their suspicion in a timely fashion.”  Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 28 (citing 
United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
325. Gay, ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414 (citing State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶ 13, 632 
N.W.2d 1, 8). 
326. Id. ¶ 17. 
327. Id. (citing State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d 906, 909). 
328. Id.  A police officer may detain an individual for as long as reasonably necessary to ef-
fectuate the purpose for the confinement.  Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. ¶ 18.  None of these searches uncovered any evidence of weapons. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. ¶ 19, 748 N.W.2d at 415-16. 
333. Id. at 415. 
334. Id. at 415-16. 
335. Id. at 416. 
336. Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 748 N.W.2d at 415-16 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
484-88 (1963) (holding that verbal statements may be deemed inadmissible if obtained by meth-
ods prohibited by the Fourth Amendment)). 
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an unreasonable seizure, making unlawfully obtained statements admissi-
ble.337  The district court concluded that reciting Miranda warnings did not 
attenuate the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation.338  Because the dis-
trict court addressed the overlap of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in sup-
pressing the statements.339 
The court quoted the United States Supreme Court’s rationale from 
Brown, and stated that the impact of the exclusionary rule would be weak-
ened if Miranda warnings alone were enough to cure an unconstitutional 
arrest.340  Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court first devised 
the test used to determine whether Miranda warnings are sufficient to cure 
Fourth Amendment violations, the court chose to adopt the precise language 
used by the Eighth Circuit in Reinholz.341  Applying the Reinholz factors in 
Gay, the court again concluded that the district court properly suppressed 
Gay’s statements.342 
The court first found that the officers informed Gay of his Miranda 
rights, which weighed against the suppression of his statements under the 
first factor.343  Next, the court noted that Gay’s statements occurred during 
the unlawful activity, which meant that the temporal proximity of the 
statements to the unlawful detention weighed in favor of suppression under 
the second factor.344  Finally, the court adopted the district court’s conclu-
sion that the purpose of Gay’s detention was to protect officer safety.345  
Law enforcement, however, detained Gay with handcuffs for approximately 
fifteen minutes.346  The officers did not release Gay after they dispelled the 
issue of officer safety.347  Therefore, the court accepted the district court’s 
findings that the Miranda warnings did not rectify the Fourth Amendment 
 
337. Id. ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416.  Neither party raised the issue on appeal, but the court ad-




340. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975)). 
341. Id. ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d at 417.  The Reinholz factors are:  “(1) whether the suspect has 
been advised of his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement; (2) the temporal proximity of his 
statements to his illegal seizure; (3) the existence of intervening causes between the illegal arrest 
and the statements; and (4) the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.”  United States v. 
Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001). 
342. Gay, ¶ 24, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. Id.  The court did not analyze the third factor, because the district court did not discuss 
any intervening causes that may have dissipated the taint of the unlawful seizure. Id. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. 
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violation.348  The majority held that the evidence supported these factual 
and legal conclusions, and affirmed the suppression order.349  Justice Sand-
strom, joined by Justice Maring, disagreed with the majority’s decision.350 
B. DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Sandstrom opined that law enforcement acted reasonably and 
that the district court misapplied the law.351  First, he stated that similar de-
tentions, which lasted longer than Gay’s, have been recognized as reason-
able.352  He equated Gay’s confinement to the detention in Houston, a civil 
rights suit.353  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the investigative 
stop reasonable where law enforcement kept the two vehicle occupants 
handcuffed for thirty-five to sixty minutes after they had been frisked.354 
Next, Justice Sandstrom stressed that the use of handcuffs to effectuate 
investigatory stops is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.355  He noted 
that there was no evidence that the use of handcuffs coerced Gay into mak-
ing the incriminating statements.356  Justice Sandstrom recognized that law 
enforcement informed Gay of his Miranda rights on two separate occa-
sions.357  Gay then chose to make the incriminating statements.358  Justice 
Sandstrom also argued that the district court’s conclusion that the use of 
handcuffs after officers frisked Gay was unreasonable has been rejected in 
several jurisdictions.359 
Finally, Justice Sandstrom determined that the actions of law enforce-
ment were reasonable under the circumstances because Gay may still have 
 
348. Id. 
349. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. 
350. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34, 748 N.W.2d at 420 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
351. Id. ¶ 28, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
352. Id. ¶ 30, 748 N.W.2d at 418. 
353. Id. (citing Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 815 
(6th Cir. 1999)).  Houston was a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than an appeal from a 
suppression order as in Gay.  Houston, 174 F.3d at 811.  The plaintiffs alleged that officers vio-
lated their Fourth Amendment by handcuffing and detaining two suspects while police investi-
gated an alleged shooting. Id. at 811-12. 
354. Gay, ¶ 30, 748 N.W.2d at 418 (citing Houston, 174 F.3d at 815). 
355. Id. ¶ 31, 748 N.W.2d at 418-20. 
356. Id. ¶ 28, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. ¶ 31, 748 N.W.2d at 418-19 (citing United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kap-
perman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Soun, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 822, 831-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999); 
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)). 
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posed a danger to law enforcement.360  Justice Sandstrom stated that the of-
ficers acted reasonably because the absence of a weapon from Gay’s person 
may not have relieved the officers’ safety concerns.361  Justice Sandstrom 
referred to the fact that Gay could have obtained a weapon from the two un-
searched vehicles that were at the scene.362  He also recognized that the de-
fendant could have accessed a weapon from a nearby building.363  Justice 
Sandstrom argued that the officers’ actions were reasonable with regard to 
officer safety.364  For these reasons, and because the majority opinion “un-
reasonably imperil[ed] officer safety,” Justice Sandstrom would have re-
versed and remanded for trial.365 
IV. IMPACT 
The essential impact of Gay is that the North Dakota Supreme Court 
rejected a per se, or “but for,” rule that Miranda warnings are sufficient to 
dissipate a Fourth Amendment violation.366  The adoption of the Brown fac-
tors though, should positively impact the criminal justice system in North 
Dakota.367  By adopting the four-prong test, the court further enabled crimi-
nal defense attorneys to advocate for added protections under the North Da-
kota Constitution.368  The adoption of the test in Gay should also encourage 
law enforcement officers to be well-educated on Fourth Amendment law.369  
Further, the decision will aid the district courts in evaluating Fourth 
Amendment issues.370 
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
In Gay, the North Dakota Supreme Court clarified one facet of interac-
tion between Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections in North Dakota.371  
 





365. Id. ¶ 33. 
366. Id. ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d at 417. 
367. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the positive impacts that Gay will have in 
North Dakota). 
368. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recognizing that criminal defense attorneys are free to 
argue that the North Dakota Constitution affords greater protections than the federal constitution). 
369. See discussion infra Part IV.B (examining the effects of Gay on North Dakota’s law 
enforcement officials). 
370. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the effects of Gay on North Dakota’s district 
courts). 
371. See Gay, ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416 (addressing the interaction between the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments). 
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The court held that administration of Miranda warnings does not cure an 
unlawful seizure.372  The court, however, neglected an opportunity to broa-
den Fourth Amendment protections under the North Dakota Constitution.373  
Instead, the court adopted the federal standard for examining the attenuation 
exception to the exclusionary rule.374  The court neither diluted nor aug-
mented the exclusionary rule’s potency in North Dakota.375 
Under the North Dakota Constitution, the court in Gay was free to pro-
vide a more stringent attenuation rule for citizens, rather than replicating the 
analysis set forth in Brown.376  Former Justice William J. Brennan of the 
United States Supreme Court once stated that “[t]he legal revolution which 
has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the inde-
pendent protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of 
our liberties cannot be guaranteed.”377  By merely adopting the Brown fac-
tors, the North Dakota Supreme Court further empowered criminal defense 
attorneys to argue for a more protective rule, or set of factors, in analyzing a 
situation similar to Gay.378  The federal constitution and the Brown decision 
set the minimum for constitutional protections, not the maximum.379 
The framers of the North Dakota Constitution intended to grant broader 
individual rights than those guaranteed by the federal constitution.380  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court is responsible for interpreting the basic indi-
vidual rights afforded by the state constitution.381  By not arguing state con-
stitutional protections, defense attorneys would deprive criminal defendants 
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of one aspect of their basic rights and ignore principles of federalism.382  
While Gay does not afford individuals greater protections under the state 
constitution, the decision will aid the district courts in analyzing similar 
search and seizure issues.383  The decision may also prompt law enforce-
ment to further educate officers on Fourth Amendment law.384 
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE DISTRICT COURTS AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent to police misconduct by ex-
cluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.385  The at-
tenuation factors from Gay minimize the likelihood that officers will make 
investigatory arrests in order to elicit incriminating statements.386  The court 
declared that evidence derived from such investigatory arrests is not made 
admissible at trial by merely administering Miranda warnings.387  Gay 
communicates to police officers that unlawful arrests followed by an ad-
ministration of the Miranda warnings is not per se sufficient to remedy the 
Fourth Amendment violation.388  This deterrent effect should prompt police 
officers to act in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and encourage 
police organizations to offer training on Fourth Amendment procedures.389 
Further, the exclusionary sanction focuses on the misbehavior of an in-
dividual officer, but may be a more effective deterrent if police departments 
disciplined officers for committing blatant Fourth Amendment violations.390  
Professor Wayne R. LaFave, an expert on the Fourth Amendment, stated 
this proposition best: “to apply the exclusionary rule when an individual of-
ficer oversteps his bounds but not when the violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is caused by systemic defects would be to turn the Fourth 
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385. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
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387. Gay, ¶ 22, 748 N.W.2d at 416-17 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 602). 
388. See id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 601-02) (stating that the Miranda warnings are not a 
“cure-all” to an unlawful arrest). 
389. Heller & Reichmuth, supra note 384, at 54 n.126 (discussing defense attorneys’ roles in 
raising the standard of “reasonableness” applied to law enforcement in order to defeat arguments 
made under the good faith exception to a warrantless search). 
390. See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050 
(1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule does not account for a police officer’s regard for depart-
mental expectations). 
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Amendment on its head.”391  By upholding the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided motivation for law 
enforcement organizations to further educate and train officers in Fourth 
Amendment law.392  Some scholars, however, contend that the exclusionary 
rule has no influence on police whatsoever.393 
Studies of police practices demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does 
not deter violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights where officers are 
willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving an alterna-
tive goal.394  Some authors have even suggested that officers may commit 
perjury in order to avoid application of the exclusionary rule.395  The district 
courts must counteract these unlawful actions.396  These offensive behaviors 
may be monitored by the district courts, and judges should take care not to 
accept these behaviors in order to prevent imposing the exclusionary sanc-
tion.397  The district courts are in a better position to be the “guardians of 
our liberties” than the appellate courts.398  The district courts can utilize the 
factors adopted in Gay as guideposts in analyzing whether Miranda warn-
ings cure an unlawful seizure.399 
Gay offers further guidance to the district courts in analyzing the inter-
action between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.400  Additionally, the re-
jection of a per se rule stating that Miranda warnings cure an unlawful sei-
zure communicates to police that Fourth Amendment violations are not 
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simply remedied by administering the warnings.401  The decision should, in 
turn, encourage law enforcement to become well-educated on search and 
seizure issues.402  Finally, the court’s adoption of Brown’s federal standard 
allows criminal defense attorneys to continue arguing for broader protec-
tions under the state constitution.403 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Gay, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted four attenuation fac-
tors to analyze whether incriminating statements obtained after an unlawful 
arrest are barred by the exclusionary rule.404  These factors include: (1) 
whether Miranda warnings were administered prior to the statements; (2) 
the temporal proximity of the statements to the unlawful seizure; (3) wheth-
er any intervening causes exist between the seizure and the statements; and 
(4) the purpose or flagrancy of the police misconduct.405  Applying these 
factors to the facts in Gay, the court held that the district court properly 
suppressed the defendant’s statements.406  The court determined that the 
stop of the vehicle the defendant rode in was constitutional, based on the 
driver’s status as a probationer.407  Additionally, the court concluded that 
the detention and frisk of the defendant was constitutional because of the 
officers’ concerns for safety.408  Finally, the court held that keeping a sus-
pect detained in handcuffs after officers dispel their concerns for safety vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment.409 
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